Posted: August 14th, 2022

Austere Nominalism: A Minimalist Approach to Universals

Austere Nominalism: A Minimalist Approach to Universals

Austere nominalism is a metaphysical view that denies the existence of universals, abstract objects, and properties. According to austere nominalists, there are only concrete particulars that have primitive features or characters. These features are not shared by different particulars, nor do they exist independently of them. Austere nominalism is a radical form of nominalism that rejects any kind of realism about universals or properties.

One of the main motivations for austere nominalism is to avoid the ontological and epistemological problems that arise from postulating universals or properties. For example, if there are universals or properties, how do we account for their nature, identity, and individuation? How do we explain their causal efficacy and their relation to particulars? How do we access them and know about them? Austere nominalists claim that these problems are insoluble and that we should adopt a more parsimonious and naturalistic ontology that does not involve any abstract entities.

Another motivation for austere nominalism is to preserve the simplicity and clarity of language and logic. Austere nominalists argue that we do not need to posit universals or properties to make sense of our ordinary discourse and reasoning. They maintain that predicates, such as “red” or “round”, do not refer to anything other than the concrete particulars that they apply to. They also hold that sentences, such as “a is red” or “a is round”, do not express any relations between particulars and universals or properties, but only state facts about the features of particulars. Austere nominalists adopt a deflationary or minimalist account of truth, according to which sentences are true if and only if they correspond to the facts.

One of the main challenges for austere nominalism is to explain the phenomenon of resemblance or similarity among particulars. If there are no universals or properties, how can we account for the fact that some particulars are alike in some respects and different in others? How can we make sense of generalizations, classifications, and comparisons based on resemblance? Austere nominalists have two main strategies to deal with this challenge. One strategy is to deny that resemblance is a real feature of the world and to treat it as a subjective or pragmatic matter. According to this view, resemblance is not something that requires explanation, but only a way of grouping or ordering particulars according to our interests and purposes. Another strategy is to accept that resemblance is a real feature of the world, but to explain it in terms of primitive characters or features of particulars. According to this view, resemblance is a basic and unanalyzable fact that does not involve any relations between particulars and universals or properties.

Austere nominalism is a controversial and radical view that has been defended by some prominent philosophers, such as Nelson Goodman, W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. It has also been criticized by many others, who have argued that it fails to account for the richness and complexity of reality, language, and thought. Some of the objections raised against austere nominalism are:

– It cannot explain the apparent generality and objectivity of our knowledge and discourse.
– It cannot account for the possibility of error and disagreement about resemblance.
– It cannot accommodate the role of mathematics and logic in science and philosophy.
– It cannot provide a satisfactory analysis of modality, causation, and counterfactuals.
– It cannot avoid committing itself to some form of realism about primitive features or characters.

Austere nominalism is a challenging and intriguing view that raises fundamental questions about the nature of reality and our understanding of it. It invites us to reconsider our assumptions and intuitions about what exists and what we can know.

References:

Carroll, J.W., & Markosian, N. (2010). An introduction to metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.

Loux, M.J. (2006). Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction (3rd ed.). Routledge.

Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of universals. Oxford University Press.

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